# **ASSESSING RISKS**

# FOR MORE INFORMATION: SECURITYEDUCATIONCOMPANION.ORG

**THREAT MODELING** helps you identify threats to the things you value and who you need to protect them from. When building a threat model, you can ask yourself the following questions.

- What do I want to protect?
- Who do I want to protect it from?
- What are the consequences if I fail?
- How likely are these consequences?
- How can I address the most likely risks?

#### THREAT MODELING GLOSSARY:

**Asset:** What I want to protect

**Adversaries:** Who I want to protect my assets from **Threats:** What are the potential consequences if I

fail?

**Risk:** The likelihood that a particular threat against a particular asset will actually occur

Adversary capability: What an adversary is able to do to achieve its aim. For example, a country's security services might have the capability to listen to telephone calls while a neighbor may have the capability to watch you from their window. To say that an adversary "has" a capability does not mean that they will necessarily use that capability. It does mean that you should consider and prepare for the possibility.

Try it! Make a threat model for a jewelry store owner:

# 1 What <u>assets</u> are you protecting?

- \$1 million worth of diamonds
- Money in the safe
- Alarm code
- Anything else?

# Who are your adversaries?

- Jewelry thieves
- **Anyone else?** (Consider: Who might have access to the jewelry store safe? What about cleaning crews, or maintenance staff?)

#### **Consider:**

- What would motivate your adversaries?
- What are your **adversaries' capabilities**?

## What are the consequences if you fail?

- Theft of jewelry
- Any other **threats**? (What if the safe code or alarm code is stolen?)

# THREAT MODEL FOR A JEWELRY STORE OWNER

#### YOU inherit a JEWELRY STORE in the city.

The JEWELRY STORE has:



- \$1 million worth of diamonds.
- A staff of five people.
- An alarm system.
- •
- A safe.
- A cash register.
- A camera monitoring the door.
- A pin-protected alarm for the door.

| 4 How likely are these conseque | iences? |
|---------------------------------|---------|
|---------------------------------|---------|

Map the likelihood of these threats occurring on the back!

### How you can address the most likely <u>risks</u>?

- Changing the passcode every month, and after an employee leaves.
- What else?

# Risk

# THREAT MODELING FOR A JEWELRY STORE

How likely are these consequences? This depends on your adversaries' capabilities.

High likelihood

Employee misplaces their key.

High-profile protest against this particular jewelry store.

Enraged bear destroys store

Low likelihood High consequence

**Threat** 

Low consequence

# **ASSESSING YOUR RISKS**

READ MORE ABOUT ASSESSING YOUR RISKS AT HTTPS://SECURITYEDUCATIONCOMPANION.ORG

| 1 | ASSETS:  | 3           | CONSEQUENCES:  |
|---|--|-------------|--|
|   | What do you want to protect?                     |             | What are the consequences if you fail to protect those assets?   |
|   |  |             |  |
|   |  |             |  |
|   |  |             |  |
|   |  |             |  |
|   |  |             |  |
|   |  | 4           | LIKELIHOOD:  |
|   |  |             | Map the likelihood on the next page!   |
| 2 | ADVERSARIES:                                     | 5           | PROTECTIONS:   |
|   | Who do you want to protect it from?              |             | What kinds of protections make sense in response?  |
|   |  |             | Fill this section out after completing #4 on the back.<br>Determining appropriate measures depends on<br>your appetite for risk. |
|   | What would motivate your                         |             |  |
|   | adversaries?                                     |             |  |
|   |  |             |  |
|   |  |             |  |
|   | What are your adversaries' <u>capabilities</u> ? | 6           | PLAN FOR CHANGE:   |
|   |  |             | Technologies and threats change.<br>Plan to reassess your risks.   |
|   |  | I will reev | valuate my threat model on:  |

# **Threat**



Risk

Low likelihood